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Are currency crises caused by irresponsible
macroeconomic policies? The answer used to
be an unqualified yes: A currency crisis was a
just retribution for government mismanagement.
However, the 1997 crises in Asia led many ob-
servers to question this view. Most of the afflicted
economies had budget surpluses and healthy for-
eign exchange reserves. While current account
deficits were large in some countries (Thailand and
Malaysia), they were very modest in others (South
Korea and Indonesia). Therefore, it is difficult
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This paper studies firm-
level leverage and per-
formance measures
before and after a cur-
rency crisis, using data
from 17 countries. We
show that, prior to a
crisis, companies that
expect to benefit from
currency depreciations
increase their leverage
more than companies
that are expected to be
harmed by the depreci-
ation. Profitability and
financial fragility ratios
display consistent pat-
terns. We provide evi-
dence that the Asian
crisis is different from
the previous European
and Latin American
ones: In Asia, all firms
become more fragile
after the crisis and their
profitability declines
and leverage increases
further, whereas else-
where there are clear
signs of recovery after a
crisis occurs.
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to argue that currency depreciations were needed for macroeconomic
reasons.
Recently, a literature that places the corporate sector and its leverage
as the central issue in currency crises has started to emerge. Most in-
fluential among those papers have been models by Aghion, Bachetta,
and Banerjee (2001) and Krugman (1999). In those papers, firms’
output prices are sticky and firms finance their operations at least par-
tially with debt denominated in a foreign currency. When shocks or loss
of confidence cause an initial currency depreciation, the declining
profitability and financial distress problems for corporations lead to
further depreciations. Hence, in these models, a currency depreciation
causes financial distress problems. The opposite view of currency
depreciations is given by Bris and Koskinen (2002). In their model,
exporting companies face a financial distress problem, which is solved
through a currency depreciation. A currency depreciation helps solve
financial distress problems even when firms have borrowed in a foreign
currency, if firms’ cash flows are denominated in a foreign currency
and its costs at least partially in a domestic currency. A currency de-
preciation is not costless, however, since it leads to excessive leverage
and risky investments prior to a depreciation. Schneider and Tornell
(2004) have a model that allows for asymmetric firm-level develop-
ments both before and after a crisis. In their model, firms operate in
either the tradable or nontradable sector. The banking sector has been
given a bailout guarantee, and at the same time, financial contracts
suffer from imperfect enforceability. The existence of these two dis-
tortions give rise to the willingness to extend credit denominated in a
foreign currency to the firms in the nontradable sector and firms credit
constrained by the extent of their net wealth. As a result, firms in the
nontradable sector can grow faster and more profitably than firms in
the tradable sector with an appreciating real exchange rate before a
crisis and suffer more when the exchange rate collapses after a crisis.
To what extent corporate financial policies are related to currency
depreciations is still an open question empirically. A currency depre-
ciation may harm corporations financed with foreign debt, as Aghion
et al. (2001) and Krugman (1999) note, and deepening financial distress
is a consequence of the currency crisis. If, instead, corporations see a
potential currency depreciation as amean of resolving corporate distress
problems, two main empirical predictions ensue: Financial distress
precedes a currency crises, followed by improving financial health; and
only those firms that benefit from the currency depreciation should
display excessive leverage prior to a crisis, as emphasized by Bris and
Koskinen (2002). In general, firms’ leverage and profitability could
develop asymmetrically before and after a crisis has occurred, as im-
plied by the model of Schneider and Tornell (2004): Firms in the
tradable sector show higher leverage and lower profitability and growth
750 Journal of Business
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preceding a crisis compared to firms in the nontradable sector and a
reversal of roles after a crisis has occurred.
This paper contributes to this growing literature of corporate leverage
and currency crises by providing empirical evidence of corporations’
financial policies and performance around currency depreciations. We
analyze micro-level data from 20 countries from Asia, Europe, and
Latin America. Seventeen countries in our sample (the crisis sample)
experienced currency devaluations over the past decade.
1
The remain-
ing three countries (Argentina, Hong Kong, and Japan), which did not
experience a currency crisis even though their currencies faced some
pressure, form our control sample (no-crisis sample). In the no-crisis
sample, we identify the date where the currency suffered speculative
attacks, which somehow lead to severe exchange rate depreciations.
This date determines the event date around which we analyze financial
policies and profitability.
We first document a median 1.91% increase in corporate debt-to-
value ratios during the last 3 years prior to a currency crisis
2
for all
countries. Such an increase in leverage is particularly large for European
and Latin American firms. In Asia, the evidence is not that clear. In
the years following a currency depreciation, we find significant in-
creases in leverage in all countries in Asia except HongKong and Japan.
In Europe and Latin America, the postcrisis evidence is mixed. How-
ever, we find significant differences in corporate financial policies in
countries that experienced a currency crisis relative to countries that did
not. Debt ratios increase by 4.43% in the first group of countries prior to
the crises, but they do not change in the second group. In addition, there
is an 8.35% increase in leverage after the crisis in the crisis sample
countries, against a 0.72% increase (only significant at the 10% level)
in the no-crisis sample.
Several theoretical explanations, already outlined, are consistent with
these findings. It is also possible that the results are mere accounting
artifacts: Since we also document that firm profitability declines prior to
a currency crisis, a reduction in earnings could automatically increase
the debt-to-value ratios. Finally, leverage increases could be completely
unrelated to currency crises, only a result of the preference for debt over
equity during the 1990s.
We try to provide some more evidence for and against the previous
theoretical arguments. In the papers by Aghion et al. (2001), Krugman
(1999), and Bris and Koskinen (2002), firms either suffer or benefit
1. Out of the 17 countries in our depreciation sample, 4 countries had strictly fixed
exchange rates, 11 countries had fixed rates within a band, and 2 countries had real exchange
rate target.
2. Referring to a currency crisis for the no-crisis sample is obviously a misnomer. For
expositional purposes and for Argentina, Hong Kong, and Japan, ‘‘before the crisis’’ and
‘‘after the crisis’’ mean before and after the speculative attacks to their currencies, respectively.
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from a currency depreciation, depending on their exchange rate ex-
posure. The asymmetric reaction to a currency depreciation is even
more explicit in Schneider and Tornell (2004). Therefore, we first sort
companies within a country into two groups, using individual com-
panies’ stock market returns. In the first group, we have companies
whose stock returns decrease when the domestic currency appreciates
with respect to the U.S. dollar (negative-exposure companies); in the
second group, we place those companies whose stock returns increase
(positive-exposure companies). The first group includes exporting
firms and firms in the tradable sector in general, while the second
group includes importing firms, firms financed with large amounts of
foreign debt, and firms in the nontradable sector.
After sorting the companies into these two groups, we show that the
companies with negative exposure have higher leverage than the com-
panies with positive exposure; moreover, the negative-exposure com-
panies increase their leverage more than positive-exposure companies
prior to a currency depreciation. Importantly, this is only true for
countries in the crisis sample. In addition, we analyze companies’
profitability and financial fragility using several standard ratios and
show that negative-exposure companies in particular become more
fragile financially before a currency depreciation. We also find that
profitability decreases for all companies before a currency crisis, but the
effect is more pronounced for the negative-exposure companies. This
decline in profitability could explain why leverage increases. However,
we show that profitability does not explain debt ratios at the time of the
currency crisis in our cross-sectional regression. In this multivariate
regression framework, controlling for firm and country characteristics,
we report that companies that benefit from a currency depreciation
have higher leverage than companies harmed by the depreciation. In-
terestingly, the results are the opposite for the no-crisis sample in almost
all respects: In general, positive-exposure companies fare worse than
negative-exposure companies in these countries. In addition, after con-
trolling for our measure of exchange rate exposure, we find the usual
proxies for corporate governance quality to be either insignificant or
with unexpected signs when used as a explanatory variables of firm
leverage.
The finding that firms that benefit from a currency depreciation in-
creased their leverage prior to the corresponding currency crisis sup-
ports the view in Bris and Koskinen (2002). The result that firms were
less profitable and are more fragile even after a currency depreciation is
consistent with the arguments posed by Aghion et al. (2001) and
Krugman (1999). We conclude that the evidence seems to support the
arguments of Bris and Koskinen (2002) in Europe, whereas the Asian
crisis is more in line with Aghion et al. (2001) and Krugman (1999).
In general, the empirical evidence is consistent with Schneider and
752 Journal of Business
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Tornell’s (2001) argument of asymmetric performance for firms
depending on whether the firms benefit or are harmed by currency
depreciations.
In addition to these models, our empirical evidence is in some
respects consistent with the paper by Aghion et al. (2004), although
their model does not explicitly deal with currency crises. In that model,
the liberalization of a country’s capital account leads to a relaxation of
credit constraints for the firms in that country. This leads to initial
increased investments and profitability for the firms in the tradable
sector. Further investments lead to decreased profitability because of
raising costs. This might lead to capital flight and a currency crisis.
Empirically, the implications of Aghion et al. (2004) are similar to Bris
and Koskinen (2002), although the economic mechanisms behind the
results are different.
Also, a growing body of literature emphasizes corporate governance
issues in currency crises. Johnson et al. (2000) show that lack of out-
side investor protection is positively related to the amount of depre-
ciation in emerging markets. Mitton (2002) provides evidence that,
during the Asian crisis, firms that had higher disclosure quality and
higher outside ownership concentration also had better stock market
performance. In addition, Lemmon and Lins (2003) show that a greater
likelihood of outside shareholder expropriation led to lower stock
market valuation during the Asian crisis. The approaches emphasizing
corporate leverage and corporate governance can be viewed as com-
plements. For example, to the extent that corporate governance prob-
lems lead to more reliance on debt financing at the expense of equity
financing, the two approaches are consistent. However, in our cross-
sectional regression, we also control for corporate governance char-
acteristics on the country level and find that our measure of exchange
rate exposure still helps explain company-level leverage, while the
corporate governance variables give inconsistent results.
The next section of the paper describes the data and its sources. In
section II, we explain our approach to estimating exchange rate ex-
posure. In section III, we study firm leverage and the relationship
between leverage and exchange rate exposure. In section IV, we relate
exchange rate exposure to several different measures of profitability. In
section V, we provide cross-sectional evidence on the determinants of
capital structure. Section VI concludes the paper.
I. Data and Sample Description
Throughout the paper, we define a currency crisis as the event in
which either a government or a central bank decides to let its currency
float or administratively devalues it. We obtain information about
currency crises that have occurred in the period 1985–2000. These are
753Corporate Financial Policies and Performance
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partly compiled in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). Additionally, Italy,
the United Kingdom, and the countries that experienced the Asian
crisis of 1997 are also included in the sample. When a country has
suffered several crises in the period 1985–2000 (this is the case, for
instance, for Brazil, Spain, and Turkey), the last one is considered
exclusively. The final sample of crises includes 17 countries, and its
description is in Table 1. Other major currency depreciations are not
included in the final sample for a variety of reasons. For example, we
do not include the Russian crisis of 1998 because of a lack of data on
Russian firms. We also eliminate Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Israel,
Peru, and Uruguay because we lack stock price data before the crises.
For some countries the most recent crisis has not been considered due
to the unavailability of data after the crisis.
3
Brazil, for instance,
suffered its last crisis in 1999. In addition, we include three countries
that did not suffer what we define as a currency crisis. However, these
countries—Argentina, Hong Kong, and Japan—either suffered severe
attacks on their currencies or experienced a modest currency depre-
ciation initially. Argentina
4
and Hong Kong
5
had a currency board,
and both countries experienced attacks on its currency, but neither
country changed its exchange rate policy. Japan’s exchange rate ini-
tially depreciated against the U.S. dollar
6
but later fully recovered. We
refer to these three countries as the no-crisis sample.
For each country in our total sample, Datastream provides a Global
Market Index, that includes a varying number of firms per country.
7
Datastream also provides accounting information regarding all the
3. We require 6 years of past information and 2 years of postcrisis data on stock prices for
the firms available in the sample to perform the estimation.
4. Following the Mexican devaluation of December 1994, the Buenos Aires stock market
witnessed the Merval blue-chip index sliding 17% in January 1995. At the same time, bonds
fell sharply and short-term interest rates nearly tripled. The peso-dollar conversion rate was
permitted to fall to 0.998. Although Argentina had a currency board, the central bank was
forced to take measures to increase the confidence in the peso and inject liquidity into the
financial system: The central bank started converting pesos into dollars at par. Banks’ reserve
requirements on deposits were allowed in the currency of choice, eliminating central bank
regulation of the denomination of reserves. Reserve requirements on dollar and peso deposit
accounts were unified. The measures were well received by the Buenos Aires stock market.
The blue-chip index closed up 10.34% the day after the announcement.
5. In October 1997, speculators pounded the Hong Kong dollar, hoping that the authorities
would follow other Southeast Asian countries in allowing the currency to depreciate. The
stock market lost $50 billion in 3 days. Hong Kong overnight interest rates increased 300% on
October 23. Speculators were shorting the Hong Kong dollar during this period.
6. The yen depreciated 7.37% in November 1997, and it was at its 5e-year low in
November 25. The Yamaichi Bank collapsed on November 22.
7. Included in each market index are 50 stocks from Brazil, 50 from Venezuela, 90 from
Mexico, 50 from Finland, 50 from Norway, 120 from Spain, 70 from Sweden, 50 from Turkey,
550 from the United Kingdom, 160 from Italy, 50 from Indonesia, 100 from South Korea, 90
fromMalaysia, 50 from the Phillippines, 100 fromSingapore, 70 fromTaiwan, 50 fromThailand.
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TABLE 1 Sample Description
Currency Depreciation
Country
Crisis Month
(t ¼ 0) Observs.
Firms in
Main Exchange
Percent in
Sample
Market Return
(t ¼ 0) (t ¼ 0) (t ¼ 0) to (t ¼ þ12)
Median
Leverage
(t ¼ 0)
Total 6,781 10,401 65.20% 3.39% 16.60% 23.52% 35.89%
Finland September 1992 38 62 61.29% 15.74% 14.17% 21.40% 47.04%
Italy September 1993 216 259 83.40% 8.27% 3.24% 1.66% 45.43%
Norway December 1992 52 123 42.28% 15.72% 7.88% 7.99% 42.78%
Spain May 1993 151 379 39.84% 4.86% 8.64% 10.82% 34.09%
Sweden November 1992 106 205 51.71% 5.11% 19.84% 27.66% 15.77%
Turkey March 1994 100 176 56.82% 14.65% 55.05% 51.61% 16.33%
United Kingdom September 1992 1,592 2,440 65.25% 3.38% 8.41% 19.79% 27.45%
Hong Kong October 1997 366 658 55.62% 8.30% .16% .15% 26.96%
Indonesia August 1997 171 281 60.85% 8.35% 17.80% 79.48% 40.00%
Japan November 1997 1740 1865 93.30% 19.50% 7.37% 2.35% 42.68%
Malaysia July 1997 353 703 50.21% 6.08% 9.42% 40.43% 28.55%
Philippines July 1997 154 221 69.68% 4.68% 9.09% 32.43% 16.95%
Singapore July 1997 197 334 58.98% 4.77% 5.05% 16.06% 28.72%
South Korea November 1997 702 776 90.46% 17.25% 49.84% 25.01% 55.22%
Taiwan October 1997 281 404 69.55% 7.65% 7.97% 14.04% 23.87%
Thailand July 1997 412 431 95.59% 29.46% 22.16% 28.36% 45.83%
Argentina January 1995 13 149 8.72% 39.36% –.99% .07% 33.23%
Brazil March 1995 76 570 13.33% 14.63% 8.69% 10.45% 18.75%
Mexico December 1994 49 206 23.79% 4.54% 35.03% 55.52% 40.00%
Venezuela December 1995 12 159 7.55% 8.37% 41.52% 29.93% 24.72%
Note.—This table displays the number of firms in the sample, number of firms in the corresponding exchange, market return in the devaluation month, and currency depreciation
in the crisis month and around the crisis month (attack month for the noncrisis sample); and median leverage at the time of the currency crises (currency attack for the noncrisis
sample). The sample includes all firms with available information in Datastream for 17 countries that suffered a currency crises in the period 1985–2000, plus Argentina, Hong
Kong, and Japan. Stock returns, exchange rates, market returns, and accounting variables are from Datastream. The number of firms in the main exchange is as of December of the
corresponding crisis year, obtained from the International Federation of Stock Exchanges’ website, at www.fibv.com/stats/ta11.xls. 7
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available firms in the corresponding market, for window of 5 years
around the year of the currency crisis.
We are able to find information in Datastream for 6781 firms from
the 20 countries we consider, 4662 firms in our crisis sample and 2119
firms in our control sample. Among those, 4376 firms are from Asia,
8
2255 from Europe, and 150 firms from Latin America. We compare
the number of firms in our sample with the total number of firms in the
stock exchange in the corresponding country as of December of the
respective crisis year, as reported by the International Federation of
Stock Exchanges. On average, our sample contains 65.20% of all the
firms listed in a country’s main stock exchange. This percentage is
lower for Latin American countries, where currency depreciations
happened earlier and, hence, the lack of data is a more severe problem.
In Table 1, we calculate the domestic stock market return during the
month of the currency depreciation. On average, stock prices decline
3.39% during the crisis month. We also calculate the currency de-
preciation relative to the U.S. dollar,
9
during both the crisis and month
and the following year. The average currency depreciation in our
sample amounts to 16.60% during the crisis month and 23.52%
during the year (including the crisis month). The largest initial de-
preciation happened in Turkey (55.05%) and the lowest in Italy
(3.24%) for the crisis sample. Indonesia suffered the biggest depre-
ciation (79.48%) in the 12 months following the crisis. Countries in
the no-crisis sample had very stable currencies, especially if mea-
sured on a yearly basis. The median debt-to-value ratio (book values)
for the total sample is 35.89%, with Korea having the highest ratio
(55.22%), and Sweden the lowest (15.77%). By regions, Asian coun-
tries display the highest debt levels, with a median leverage of 39.35%.
European countries have a 28.57% debt ratio and the median for Latin
American is 23.99%.
Table 2 describes the exchange rate regimes for the countries in
our sample. Strictly speaking, only Brazil, Mexico, and the Philippines
had fixed exchange rates prior to their currency devaluations. In ad-
dition to the member countries in the European Union, Finland,
Norway, and Sweden maintained their exchange rates within a band
with respect to the European currency unit (ECU). Other countries
(South Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, and Taiwan) fixed their real
exchange rates with respect to either the U.S. dollar or a basket of
currencies. Malaysia and Venezuela allowed for fluctuations with re-
spect to the dollar. Figure 1 shows that, although pegged to the dollar,
8. Pomerleano (1998), with a sample of firms that include Japan and Hong Kong, em-
ploys data from 734 companies.
9. Throughout the paper, exchange rates are calculated as units of dollars per domestic
currency.
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TABLE 2 Exchange Rate Regimes in Countries That Have Suffered Currency Crises
Argentina Fixed peso-dollar exchange rate
Brazil Fixed against the dollar six months before the crisis.
Spain The exchange rate is maintained within the margin of 15 percent around the bilateral central rates against other participating
currencies, with the exception of Germany and the Netherlands, in which case the exchange rate is maintained within a margin of
2.25 percent.
Finland Unilaterally pegged to Ecu.
Hong Kong Currency Board since 1989
Japan Flexible Exchange rates
Indonesia Explicit real exchange rate targeting with the nominal rate falling from 1900 rupieh to the US $ in 1990 to 2400 by the beginning of
1997
South Korea The Korean won followed periods of Bxity to the US $ but had a more Cexible exchange rate regime. The Won depreciated in nominal terms from
1990 until the beginning of 1993 (from 700 to almost 800 won per dollar). Next, it traded in a very narrow range of 800 to 770 won /$ between
the beginning of 1993 and the middle of 1996. Then, it started to depreciate by about 10% reaching a rate of 884 at the end of 1996
Mexico Fixed peso-dollar exchange rate
Malaysia A 10% range of 2.7 to 2.5 ringitt to the US$ for most of the years between 1990 and the beginning of 1997
Norway The krone was Brst pegged to the Ecu on October 19, 1990, within a margin of +2.25% per cent from a Bxed rate of NKr7.9940 per Ecu.
Philippines The Peso Cuctuated in a 15% range of 28 to 24 between 1990 and the beginning of 1995 but was practically Bxed at a 26.2 rate to the US dollar from
the spring of 1995 until the beginning of 1997
Sweden Behaved as an ERM country, although not ofBcially in the system.
Singapore The currency actually appreciated in nominal terms throughout the 1990s going from a rate of 1.7 in 1990 to a rate of 1.4 by the end of 1996.
Italy The exchange rate is maintained within a margin of 15 percent around the bilateral central rates against other participating currencies, with the
exception of Germany and the Netherlands, in which case the exchange rate is maintained within a margin of2.25 percent.
Taiwan Real exchange rate targeting allowing its currency to fall from a rate of 24 New Taiwan dollars per US$ in 1990 to a rate of 27.8 by the end of 1996.
Thailand The Thai Bath was effectively Bxed in a narrow 25.2 to 25.6 to the US$ from 1990 until 1997
Turkey Managed Coating exchange rate.
United Kingdom The exchange rate is maintained within a margin of 15 percent around the bilateral central rates against other participating currencies, with the
exception of Germany and the Netherlands, in which case the exchange rate is maintained within a margin of2.25 percent.
Venezuela The exchange rate is maintained within margins of 7.5 percent.
Note.—The Table describes the Exchange Rate Regimes of seventeen countries that have suffered currency crises since 1990, and three countries that have suffered severe
currency attacks during the same period. The description corresponds to the regime prevailing one month prior to the last currency depreciation considered in Table 1.
Source.—Nouriel Roubini, ‘‘An Introduction to Open Economy Macroeconomics. Currency Crises and the Asian Crisis’’, in http://www.stern.nyu.edu/nroubini/NOTES/
macro5.htm#9, and Lexis-Nexis. 7
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Fig. 1.—Exchange Rate Changes before Currency Crises. The graph shows the av-
erage appreciation or depreciation of the nominal exchange rate U.S. dollar/domestic
currency in the 72 months preceding the currency crises in (a), Latin America (Brazil,
Mexico, and Venezuela), (b), Europe (Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and
the United Kingdom), (c), Asia ( Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand), and (d ), the no-crisis sample of countries with either floating
rates or currency boards (Argentina, Hong Kong, and Japan) considered in the paper.
(a) Crisis Sample Latin America
(b) Crisis Sample: Europe
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Latin American currencies fluctuated the most before the crises. Brazil
pegged the real only 6 months before its last devaluation, and Mexico
suffered several crises before the ones we consider in this paper. Asian
exchange rates were the least volatile in the last 6 years before a crisis
(the standard deviation of the monthly change in exchange rates is
0.84% in Asia, 1.54% in Europe, and 5.52% in Latin America).
In the next section, we survey the literature on exchange rate ex-
posure and propose a new methodology that allows us to differen-
tiate firms depending on whether they benefit from or are harmed by
(c) Crisis Sample: Asia
(d ) No Crisis Sample
Fig. 1.—Continued.
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currency depreciations. We regress the stock return of every firm on
exchange rate changes and the component of the domestic market
return orthogonal to the changes in the exchange rate.
II. Exchange Rate Exposure
For the past 20 years, financial researchers have paid a great deal of
attention to how to measure a firm’s exposure to exchange rate
movements. The basic models can be grouped into two categories:
accounting-based exposure and stock-price-based exposure. For our
purposes, the accounting-based approach poses at least three prob-
lems. First of all, lack of data. The number of firms for which data on
exports is available is quite limited in emerging markets.
10
Second,
foreign sales may not be an accurate proxy for exchange rate expo-
sure, because of hedging and debt denominated in foreign currencies.
Finally, a firm that operates only in the domestic market nonethe-
less may be exposed to exchange rate risk, if competitors are foreign
firms that sell to the country where the domestic firm operates.
11
There-
fore, movements in the exchange rate affect the competitiveness of
the domestic firm and its profits, Hence, in this paper we use a stock-
market-based measure of exchange rate exposure.
Among the studies that focus on stock price-based exposure, Jorion
(1990, 1991), Bodnar and Gentry (1993), and Amihud (1994) regress a
company’s stock return on exchange rate changes and additional control
variables such as a market portfolio return.
12
Jorion (1991) uses a two-
factor model, with the value-weighted stock market return as the first
factor and the orthogonal component of innovations in a trade-weighted
exchange rate as the second factor. The orthogonalization eliminates
spurious pricing of the exchange rate factor because of a possible cor-
relation between exchange rate and market return.
Finally, Bodnar and Wong (2000) suggest that the inclusion of a
market portfolio increases the precision of the residual exposure esti-
mates. However, if the market portfolio has a nonzero exposure, in-
cluding a market portfolio as a regressor shifts the distribution of the
residual exposure estimates with respect to the total exposure counter-
parts. Therefore, residual exposure estimates reflect the deviation of the
10. In their paper on the Asian crises of 1997, Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper (2003) are
able to find data on exports for only the largest 50 companies in each country.
11. For example, shipbuilders in China argued for a devaluation of the renminbi in 1998,
since Japanese and South Korean shipbuilders became more competitive as a result of the
1997 crises (Financial Times, July 6, 1998).
12. In the early studies of Dumas (1978), Adler and Dumas (1983), and Hodder (1982),
exposure was measured by the regression coefficient of the real value of the firm on the
exchange rate. Although these models are easy to implement, they find the percentage of
firms with a significant exposure to exchange rate movements to be low.
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firm’s exposure from the market’s portfolio exposure. As most studies
use a value-weighted portfolio, dominated by large firms with a more
negative exposure to exchange rate movements, the residual exposure
estimates suffer from a positive shift. The solution the authors suggest is
the use of an equal-weight market portfolio to correct for the correlation
between firm size and the sign of the exchange rate exposure.
A. An Alternative Approach
Our calculation of the exchange rate exposure is inspired by Jorion
(1991). However, our procedure is exactly the opposite of Jorion’s: In
explaining individual companies’ stock returns, we use as regressors
the change in exchange rate and the component of market return or-
thogonal to the change in exchange rate. This methodology circum-
vents the critique made by Bodnar and Wong (2000). We measure
exchange rate exposure in the absolute sense, not relative to the market
as a whole. To avoid nonsynchronous movements in exchange rates
and stock returns, we use monthly data.
First we estimate the following regression for each country in our
sample:
R
j
mt ¼ g jo þ g
j
1R
j
xt þ v
j
st for all j ¼ 1; ::: ; 20 ð1Þ
where R
j
mt is the market return, and R
j
xt is the change in the exchange rate in
country j. We estimate the g coefficients using monthly data from month
t ¼ 72 to month t ¼ 37 relative to the currency depreciation month.13
Next, we calculate F
j
mt ¼ R
j
mt  ĝ jo þ ĝ
j
1R
j
xt
 
from the previous regres-
sion and use the estimated orthogonal component of market return in the
regression:
Rijt ¼ yi þ hxi R
j
xt þ hmi F
j
mt þ eijt ð2Þ
where Rij is the stock return of firm i in country j, R
j
x is the monthly change
in the exchange rate in country j, and Fjm is the estimated orthogonal
component for market j. Note that, if the ĝ1 coefficients are not signifi-
cantly different from zero, the orthogonalization induces an error in
variables problem and the variance of ĥxi is inflated. Therefore, we cal-
culate Fmt with ĝ1 ¼ 0 when its significance level
14
is higher than 10%.
13. Calculating market-based exchange rate exposure can be problematic for countries
with currency boards. Argentina, for instance, has had a currency board since 1991. We use
data on Argentinian companies from 1989 to 1992 to calculate exchange rate exposures
(Argentina crises happened in 1995), so firm sensitivities are calculated with pre-currency
board data. Hong Kong pegged its currency to the U.S. dollar in 1983. However, the parity
has changed constantly since then.
14. The results in the paper are not sensitive to the choice of the minimum significance
level. In fact, when we limit ourselves to significance levels of 1% of better, our ERB
estimates arise from regressing stock returns on exchange rate changes directly (see table 3).
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The estimated ĥxi values are, as stated, measures of firm i’s exposure to
exchange rate risk (the exchange rate beta or ERB).
15
Exchange rate exposure can be also affected by changes in leverage.
A firm that borrows in a foreign currency is more likely to display a
positive ERB. Thus, the ERB becomes endogenous. To avoid this
problem, the estimation window for the ERB coefficients ends 3 years
prior to the corresponding currency crisis. The changes in leverage we
analyze in the paper, ranging from year t ¼ 3 to year t ¼ þ2 relative
to the crisis year, are therefore exogenous to past currency exposures.
Some of the countries where we calculate exchange rate exposures
had fixed exchange rate regimes during the estimation period. Intui-
tively, one expects exchange rate betas to be insignificant because of
the invariability of exchange rates. However, it is worth noting that, as
Figure 1 shows, the nominal exchange rates in these countries fluc-
tuated considerably. In Europe, currencies were allowed to fluctuate
within a band. In Asia, some of the pegs were real; in other countries
the currency was pegged to the yen and not the dollar. Finally, in still
other countries like Taiwan, the currency fluctuated, also within a
band. This is clear evidence that the exchange rate regimes did not
eliminate firms’ currency risk.
In Table 3, we show for each country the average and median ex-
change rate betas and the market betas
16
as well as each individual
market exposure coefficient to exchange rate movements, following
the methodology outlined earlier. The average exchange rate beta is
the size-weighted average of the exchange rate betas calculated for the
firms in a particular country. The market exposure is, for every country,
the estimate of g1 in regression (1).
Only in eight countries, is the country exposure (the g1 coefficient)
significant at the 10% level or better. All European countries, except
Turkey, have a negative value for g1, whereas in Asia, countries have
both negative and positive exposures. In Thailand, for instance, the
country exposure is –5.659 (significant at the 5% level). Indonesia, at
the other extreme, displays a country exposure of 6.029 (also signif-
icant at the 5% level). In our control sample, Argentina has a negative
country exposure of –0.760 (significant at the 5% level).
We expect exporting firms to display a negative exchange rate beta,
while domestic firms should have a positive exposure. Seoul Foods, for
instance, a South Korean firm that manufactures bread and snack foods
15. In this paper, we report only the results we get using all of our observations. As a
robustness check, we also calculated all the results using only the observations whose
estimates of the exchange rate exposure are significant at the 10% level or lower. None of the
qualitative results change. These results are available on request.
16. If the estimates for country exposure gb1 are significant, then we report the orthogo-
nalized market betas; otherwise, ordinary market betas are reported.
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TABLE 3 Exchange Rate Beta
Exchange
Rate Beta
Market
Beta
Country
Exposure
Negative Exchange
Rate Beta
Positive Exchange
Rate Beta
Country N Mean Median Mean Median Estimate p-value % Firms % Significant % Firms % Significant
Total 6,781 0.21772 0.10233 0.84968 0.7973 0.022*** (0.0087) 64.73% 9.73% 35.27% 6.88%
Finland 38 0.349 0.147 0.360 0.643 0.388 (0.2031) 74.42% 9.30% 25.58% 0.00%
Italy 216 0.341 0.277 0.581 0.570 0.132 (0.6555) 69.09% 17.27% 30.91% 0.45%
Norway 52 0.228 0.081 0.542 0.692 0.278 (0.6002) 67.74% 6.45% 32.26% 0.00%
Spain 151 0.183 0.195 0.771 0.806 0.340 (0.2520) 68.07% 7.83% 31.93% 0.60%
Sweden 106 0.817 1.106 0.679 0.787 1.240** (0.0239) 79.34% 24.79% 20.66% 0.83%
Turkey 100 2.952 3.234 1.212 1.071 2.957** (0.0348) 16.13% 3.23% 83.87% 3.23%
United Kingdom 1,592 0.080 0.084 0.911 0.977 0.507* (0.0916) 83.26% 8.37% 16.74% 0.18%
Hong Kong 366 0.570 0.422 0.626 0.614 7.307 (0.4639) 43.48% 2.56% 56.52% 1.79%
Indonesia 171 2.814 2.730 0.671 0.639 6.029** (0.0139) 25.98% 0.98% 74.02% 15.69%
Japan 1,740 0.011 0.037 1.072 1.055 0.119 (0.6314) 66.24% 17.41% 33.76% 22.54%
Malaysia 353 1.354 1.053 1.302 1.277 0.681 (0.3142) 44.53% 10.94% 55.47% 2.08%
Philippines 154 0.048 0.000 0.434 0.330 0.227 (0.6908) 38.42% 3.39% 61.58% 0.56%
Singapore 197 1.151 1.029 0.966 1.002 0.584 (0.4458) 82.88% 7.21% 17.12% 0.90%
South Korea 702 0.208 0.000 0.446 0.376 1.089 (0.6180) 79.74% 2.12% 20.26% 0.40%
Taiwan 281 0.094 0.182 0.586 0.585 1.593 (0.1941) 67.14% 0.31% 22.86% 4.04%
Thailand 412 0.885 0.288 0.375 0.394 5.659** (0.0233) 61.57% 9.84% 38.43% 1.82%
Argentina 13 1.483 1.026 0.950 0.985 0.760** (0.0185) 56.52% 47.83% 43.48% 0.00%
Brazil 76 0.247 0.000 0.364 0.253 1.855** (0.0202) 44.64% 3.57% 55.36% 0.89%
Mexico 49 2.078 1.999 0.027 0.454 4.443** (0.0480) 76.71% 8.22% 23.29% 0.00%
Venezuela 12 0.227 0.291 0.935 0.816 1.806 (0.1905) 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
Note.—Number of firms in the sample per country, size-weighted average firm exchange rate beta, and average firm market beta. Size is as of the year of the currency crisis.
‘Country Exposure’ is the coefficient of a regression of the country’s market return on exchange rate changes. Stock returns, Exchange rates, Market Returns and accounting
variables are from Datastream.
* and ** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1 and 0.05 levels or better, respectively. 7
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(arguably a nonexporting firm) has a beta of 1.783. An exporting firm
such as Shin Corporation,
17
from Taiwan, has a beta of –4.241. The
results for the average market betas are consistent with Bodnar and
Wong (2000), since we find markets to be exposed to currency
movements.
Therefore, in the absence of data on the structure of the balance sheet
for each firm, we are able to classify every firm in the sample into two
categories, depending on its exposure to exchange rate movements:
firms that benefit from currency depreciations and firms that suffer
from depreciations. It is worth noting that exporting firms may have an
insignificant exchange rate beta if they hedge their currency exposure
or have borrowed in foreign currencies.
18
We rank firms in a particular country by their exchange rate beta.
Firms are not comparable in terms of exchange rate exposure across
countries. Therefore, we rank each firm with respect to the other
companies in the same country by splitting the sample between firms
with negative and positive exchange-rate betas.
In the next section, we analyze the different effects of the currency
depreciation on firms, depending on whether the firm has negative or
positive exposure to currency movements.
III. Firm Leverage
In this section, we report debt-to-value ratios, as a measure of leverage,
for all the firms in our sample.
19
The debt-to-value ratio is analyzed for
the 3 years preceding the currency devaluation, as well as for 2 years
after the devaluation. For each firm, we gather data on its total debt-to-
value ratio as well as on the percentage of short-term debt to total debt
from Datastream. Both ratios are in book values. We use book values
primarily because using market values yields spurious results. For ex-
ample, a decline in stock prices before a currency depreciation implies
an increase in debt-to-value ratios with no increase in the amount of
debt, if market values are used.
First, we report firm-level debt-to-value ratios country by country
and on a regional level. The results are shown in table 4. For the overall
17. Shiang Shin Corporation, located in Taiwan, is engaged in the manufacturing and
exporting of nitrile gloves, latex surgical gloves, latex examination gloves, vinyl exami-
nation gloves and other disposable medical products. Its main markets are in the United
States, Europe, Australia, Japan, and Central and South America.
18. Allayannis and Ihrig (2001) and Dominguez and Tesar (2001) provide evidence, that
estimates of exchange rate exposure are time-varying and often change signs. In our context,
classification of a firm to a wrong exchange rate exposure group would be a conservative
mistake.
19. Throughout the paper, we consider the debt-to-value ratio as the object of study. The
results do not change qualitatively when we use the debt-to-equity ratio instead.
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TABLE 4 Debt to Value Ratio
Country N t ¼ 3 t ¼ 2 t ¼ 1 t ¼ 0 t ¼ þ1 t ¼ þ2
Change from
(t ¼ 3) to
(t ¼ 1) p Value
Change from
(t ¼ 0) to
(t ¼ þ2) p Value
Total sample 6,781 33.71% 34.02% 35.56% 35.86% 38.87% 37.50% 1.91%*** (<.0001) 3.73%*** (<.0001)
Europe 2,255 24.78% 28.08% 28.88% 28.57% 28.52% 27.10% 12.78%*** (<.0001) 2.66% (.4820)
Finland 38 46.65% 51.08% 46.51% 47.04% 53.71% 46.56% 17.96% (.1602) 2.08% (.5016)
Italy 216 38.34% 43.59% 41.16% 45.43% 50.28% 43.98% 2.32% (.4762) 4.90% (.2315)
Norway 52 43.92% 34.43% 34.19% 42.78% 50.95% 43.91% 4.36% (.4903) 5.61% (.4892)
Spain 151 25.80% 31.37% 30.39% 34.09% 29.50% 31.74% 2.35% (.3509) 4.72% (.9905)
Sweden 106 12.21% 13.50% 15.51% 15.77% 14.43% 17.94% 6.08% (.5353) 7.83% (.6714)
Turkey 100 19.63% 29.63% 23.42% 16.33% 29.34% 19.20% 25.93% (.2413) 5.47% (.4455)
United Kingdom 1,592 24.20% 27.65% 28.60% 27.45% 27.42% 26.09% 14.38%*** (<.0001) 3.01% (0.8201)
Asia 4,376 39.47% 38.47% 39.07% 39.35% 44.35% 43.65% 0.42%*** (<.0001) 4.83%*** (<.0001)
Hong Kong 366 21.51% 25.63% 28.80% 26.96% 27.79% 27.84% 22.40%*** (<.0001) 1.43%** (.0193)
Indonesia 171 45.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 50.00% 50.00% 11.11% (.1218) 25.00%*** (<.0001)
Japan 1,740 45.38% 45.12% 43.99% 42.68% 41.84% 43.40% 1.16%*** (.0001) .73% (.1190)
Malaysia 154 21.50% 18.16% 23.36% 28.55% 37.41% 37.74% 5.54%** (.0156) 39.99%*** (<.0001)
Philippines 197 8.60% 8.32% 14.99% 16.95% 24.99% 26.38% 12.33% (.3846) 29.69%*** (.0001)
Singapore 702 20.99% 20.80% 24.69% 28.72% 33.40% 32.93% 18.47%*** (<.0001) 10.92%*** (.0006)
South Korea 353 53.45% 52.22% 52.88% 55.22% 61.91% 53.52% 3.22%*** (<.0001) 2.51%*** (.0005)
Taiwan 281 28.54% 22.08% 22.25% 23.87% 27.80% 29.73% 5.92% (.6639) 24.51%*** (<.0001)
Thailand 412 39.30% 40.29% 46.29% 45.83% 61.48% 54.99% 8.08%*** (<.0001) 15.35%*** (.0004)
Latin
America 150 18.30% 18.25% 22.19% 23.99% 28.34% 29.79% 7.16%* (.0586) 21.06%*** (.0002)
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TABLE 4 (Continued )
Country N t ¼ 3 t ¼ 2 t ¼ 1 t ¼ 0 t ¼ þ1 t ¼ þ2
Change from
(t ¼ 3) to
(t ¼ 1) p Value
Change from
(t ¼ 0) to
(t ¼ þ2) p Value
Argentina 13 18.30% 24.97% 34.55% 33.23% 38.33% 32.42% 36.70%* (.0938) 18.47% (.2163)
Brazil 76 21.42% 18.50% 20.92% 18.75% 33.19% 35.68% 8.67% (.8125) 95.55%*** (.0039)
Mexico 49 32.58% 33.88% 38.27% 40.00% 54.74% 49.87% 15.75%** (.0269) 27.34%*** (<.0001)
Venezuela 12 24.13% 21.43% 21.06% 24.72% 21.67% 23.36% 1.01% (.8438) 8.79% (0.3750)
Crisis
sample 4,662 30.13% 31.85% 33.22% 34.34% 38.88% 36.24% 4.43%*** (<.0001) 8.35%*** (<.0001)
No-crisis
sample 2,119 40.32% 40.25% 40.47% 38.40% 38.41% 39.64% .01% (.4082) .72%* (.0956)
Difference
( p value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.3826) (.0002) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Non-Asian
countries 2,405 24.47% 27.50% 28.60% 28.20% 28.52% 27.33% 12.53%*** (.0000) 1.19%*** (.0875)
Difference
Asian–Non-
Asian
( p value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Note.—This table displays the median Debt to Value Ratio by country. The debt-to-value ratio is calculated dividing total debt by the sum of total debt plus the book value of
equity. In the last panel, we report p-values corresponding to a two-tailed Wilcoxon test of difference in medians. Stock returns, Exchange rates, Market Returns and accounting
variables are from Datastream.
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
7
6
6
J
o
u
rn
a
l
o
f
B
u
sin
ess
#04409 UCP: BN article # 770404
sample, the median increase in leverage is 1.91% in the 2 years pre-
ceding a crisis (significant at the 1% level). The increase is 12.78% in
Europe (significant at the 1% level), 0.42% in Asia (also significant at
the 1% level), and 7.16% in Latin America (significant at the 10%
level). For the countries with currency crises, the increase is a signif-
icant 4.43%, but for the control sample, there is no increase in leverage
prior to the currency attack. In levels, Asia as a region has the highest
leverage throughout. At the country level, in the year of a crisis,
we document high leverage in Europe for Finland, Italy, and Norway
(all above 40%); in Asia for Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and Thailand
(ranging from 40% to over 51%); and in Latin America for Mexico
(40%).
In the 2 years after a crisis, the debt ratio increases by 3.73% for the
overall sample (significant at the 1% level). For the crisis sample, the
increase is 8.35% (significant at the 1% level), but for the control
sample, the increase is only 0.72% (significant at the 10% level). In the
postcrisis period, we document markedly different developments de-
pending on the region. In Europe, there is not much change in the
leverage level after the crisis. Asia and Latin America both exhibit a
significant increase in debt-to-value ratios. For Asia, the increase in
leverage is consistent throughout all the countries, except for Hong
Kong and Japan, both of which belong to our control sample. Based on
changes in leverage, the crises in Europe and Asia are different:
increases in leverage before the crises for both regions but continuing
increases in Asia even after the crisis, while in Europe there is no
change for the postcrisis period. If we group all the non-Asian countries
together, there is even a significant decline in leverage after the crises
(1.19%).
After studying the changes in leverage on a firm level, we sort firms
into two groups based on their exchange rate exposure. Since in
Aghion et al. (2001) and Bris and Koskinen (2002) the effect of de-
preciation on firms’ financial distress problems is the opposite and
Schneider and Tornell (2001) predict different patterns for firms in the
tradable and nontradable sectors, it is important to establish what kind
of firms increase their leverage prior to a currency crisis and what
happens to different firms and their leverage after a crisis.
The results are shown in table 5 on a regional level for companies
sorted into two groups based on their exchange rate exposure. For our
crisis sample, we find that firms that benefit from a currency deprecia-
tion (those with negative exchange rate beta) increase their debt-to-
value ratios 7.35% in median (significant at the 1% level) in the 2-year
period that precedes a devaluation, while firms that suffer from a de-
preciation increase leverage by 1.59% (significant at the 1% level). The
difference between negative- and positive-exposure firms is also sig-
nificant at the 1% level. Negative-exchange-rate-beta firms increase
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TABLE 5 Debt-to-Value Ratio at the Region Level, by Exchange Rate Beta
From t ¼ 3 to
t ¼ 1
From t ¼ 0 to
t ¼ þ2
Region
Exchange
Rate Beta N t ¼ 3 t ¼ 2 t ¼ 1 t ¼ 0 t ¼ þ1 t ¼ þ2 Change p Value Change p Value
Crisis vs. No-Crisis Countries
Crisis sample:
Total Negative 3,138 29.46% 31.93% 34.09% 36.02% 38.50% 36.64% 7.35%*** (<.0001) 2.87%*** (<.0001)
Positive 1,524 30.91% 31.80% 32.35% 33.10% 39.16% 35.50% 1.59%*** (<.0001) 14.97%*** (<.0001)
(.2488) (.2616) (.0044) (.0003) (.3975) (.5224) (.0013) (.0001)
Crisis sample:
Europe Negative 1,874 25.65% 29.08% 29.68% 29.20% 29.30% 27.93% 13.66%* (.0991) –3.96%*** (.0090)
Positive 381 21.61% 21.23% 23.54% 23.00% 26.69% 25.11% –1.86% (.6794) 2.06%* (.0967)
(.0018) (.1068) (.3492) (.2244) (.0122) (.0063) (.6715) (.7114)
Crisis sample:
Asia Negative 1,255 42.08% 42.01% 46.52% 48.69% 51.72% 50.00% 5.69%*** (<.0001) 6.13%*** (<.0001)
Positive 1,015 32.82% 27.95% 29.59% 32.78% 45.52% 46.50% –3.92% (.5569) 25.00%*** (<.0001)
(.3842) (.1535) (.0033) (.0002) (.0033) (.2774) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Crisis sample:
Latin America Negative 94 17.83% 20.56% 23.02% 27.03% 31.54% 31.22% 13.46%*** (<.0001) 25.65% (.2997)
Positive 43 18.96% 17.58% 17.94% 16.41% 21.38% 24.32% 8.75%*** (<.0001) 21.35%*** (.0008)
(.6268) (.7359) (.6342) (.9015) (.8411) (.5630) (.5254) (.0022)
No-crisis
sample: total Negative 1,369 40.21% 39.54% 39.16% 37.78% 38.12% 38.37% –.71% (.3121) .85% (.1588)
Positive 750 40.23% 40.92% 41.78% 39.81% 39.08% 41.30% .62%** (.0288) .60% (.3514)
(.6189) (.3838) (.1589) (.0969) (.3200) (.1337) (.0307) (.8016)
Difference crisis–
no crisis
( p value) Negative (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.0004) (.5994) (.1028) (<.0001) (.0021)
Positive (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.4419) (.0001) (.3446) (<.0001)
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From t ¼ 3 to
t ¼ 1
From t ¼ 0 to
t ¼ þ2
Region
Exchange
Rate Beta N t ¼ 3 t ¼ 2 t ¼ 1 t ¼ 0 t ¼ þ1 t ¼ þ2 Change p Value Change p Value
Asian vs. Non-Asian Countries
Asian countries:
All Negative 2,642 41.11% 40.52% 42.09% 42.72% 45.54% 43.58% 1.03%*** (<.0001) 1.37%*** (<.0001)
Positive 1,734 36.83% 33.57% 34.73% 35.64% 42.56% 44.09% –1.08%* (.0662) 15.20%*** (<.0001)
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0036) (.3124) (.2897) (.0011)
Non-Asian
countries: All Negative 1,701 25.26% 28.75% 29.48% 29.13% 29.33% 27.95% 14.03%*** (<.0001) –2.87% (.9833)
Positive 418 20.77% 20.03% 22.41% 22.98% 26.71% 25.58% .14%*** (.0070) 8.09%*** (.0002)
(.0356) (.0000) (.0000) (.0023) (.1337) (.2304) (.1386) (.0000)
Difference Asian–
Non-Asian
( p value) Negative (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.0014)
Positive (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.4953) (.0570)
Note.—Median Debt to Value Ratio by country and exchange rate beta. The debt-to-value ratio is calculated dividing total debt by the sum of total debt plus the book value
of equity. Tests of significance are based on a Wilcoxon signed rank test. The third row in every panel is the p-value for a two-tailed test of equal medians in negative and
positive exchange rate beta firms. We also report the p-value for a test of equality of medians crisis vs. no crisis sample, as well as Asian vs. non Asian countries.
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
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their leverage while the positive-exchange-rate-beta firms decrease their
leverage in Europe (median increase 13.66%, significant at the 10%
level, compared to a insignificant decrease of 1.86%) and in Asia
(5.69% median increase versus a decrease of 3.92%, significantly dif-
ferent at the 1% level). In Latin America, both types of firms increase
their leverage (13.46% and 8.75% median increases). The results are
reversed for the control sample, where negative-exchange-rate-beta
firms decrease their leverage by an insignificant 0.71% and positive-
exchange-rate-beta firms increase by 0.62% (significant at the 5%
level). Hence, firms behave differently in the crisis sample and in the no-
crisis sample depending on their exchange rate exposure. In general, in
the crisis sample, the firms that have negative exposure increase their
leverage more than positive-exposure firms. For the control sample, the
opposite holds. Asia as whole (the crisis subsample from Asia plus
Hong Kong and Japan) does not exhibit large increases in leverage.
In the 2 years that follow the currency depreciation, the patterns
are reversed. In the crisis sample, positive-exchange-rate-beta firms
increase their leverage significantly more than negative-exchange-rate-
beta firms (2.87% for negative-exposure firms and 14.97% for posi-
tive-exposure firms, significantly different at the 10% level). In the
control sample, there is no change in leverage after the crisis.
On the regional level, we can observe clear differences. In Asia and
Latin America, leverage increases for both types of firms after the
crisis. In Asia, the positive-exposure firms increase their leverage by
25.00% (significant at the 1% level) and negative-exposure firms by
6.13% (also significant at the 1% level, and further, the difference is
significant at the 1% level). Based on this evidence of increasing
leverage, currency depreciations did not help alleviate financial dis-
tress problems, especially in Asia. The situation is markedly different
in Europe for the 2 years after the crisis occurred. Negative-exposure
firms show declining leverage in Europe in the 2 years following the
crisis. The median decrease is 3.96% (significant at the 1% level).
Moreover, debt-to-value ratios remain clearly on a higher level in Asia
than in Europe or Latin America throughout the pre- and postcrisis
periods. The Asian and non-Asian samples both exhibit big leverage
increases for the positive ERB firms.
We also analyze the changes in short-term debt ratios to total debt,
where short-term is defined as a maturity of less than 1 year. Results are
in table 6. For the overall crisis sample and for Europe and Latin
America, the median short-term debt to total debt ratio actually declines
both in the 2 years before 2 and after a crisis. This holds for both
negative- and positive-exchange-rate-beta firms. The Asian crisis sub-
sample shows somewhat different results, since the negative-exposure
firms show a significant increase in the 2 years preceding a crisis (an
increase of 1.16%, significant at the 1% level). Moreover, if we limit
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TABLE 6 Percentage of Short-Term Debt on Total Debt
From (t ¼ 3) to
(t ¼ 1)
From (t ¼ 0) to
(t ¼ þ2)
Region
Exchange
Rate Beta N t ¼ 3 t ¼ 2 t ¼ 1 t ¼ 0 t ¼ þ1 t ¼ þ2 Change p Value Change p Value
Crisis vs. No-Crisis Countries
Crisis sample:
total Negative 3,138 17.33% 17.05% 15.87% 16.58% 12.96% 11.39% 9.09% (.4133) 23.30%*** (.0000)
Positive 1,524 19.00% 19.23% 18.16% 20.21% 17.17% 14.96% 6.64%** (.0216) 19.03%*** (.0030)
(.2947) (.0174) (.0008) (.9158) (.0674) (<.0001) (.1953) (.5680)
Crisis sample:
Europe Negative 1,874 12.42% 11.13% 9.62% 9.37% 8.40% 8.03% 21.60% (.1285) 11.46% (.2767)
Positive 381 12.97% 13.05% 11.99% 11.76% 9.03% 8.78% 9.65% (.6761) 12.92% (.8799)
(.7849) (.6786) (.2473) (.1772) (.9514) (.7394) (.1861) (.7445)
Crisis sample:
Asia Negative 1,255 27.58% 29.10% 27.35% 31.78% 23.57% 17.83% 1.16%*** (.0001) 33.12%*** (<.0001)
Positive 1,015 21.88% 21.99% 20.70% 25.18% 21.38% 17.83% 4.77%** (.0158) 19.57%*** (.0007)
(.0009) (.0001) (<.0001) (.0002) (.2912) (.4323) (.0277) (0.0016)
Crisis sample:
Latin America Negative 94 5.92% 5.71% 6.13% 4.93% 12.26% 5.15% 29.77% (.3599) 35.25% (.4207)
Positive 43 13.82% 12.31% 13.50% 4.22% 9.16% 4.73% 13.73% (.8984) 38.43% (.1144)
(.1100) (.0795) (.2953) (.8551) (.3635) (.9641) (.4081) (.7684)
No-crisis sample:
total Negative 1,369 19.16% 20.08% 20.88% 19.74% 17.73% 18.07% 4.91%*** (<.0001) 5.29% (.1973)
Positive 750 19.88% 21.79% 21.90% 20.47% 18.86% 17.95% 2.64%*** (<.0001) 2.99% (.8239)
(.2093) (.0340) (.0937) (.1582) (.0738) (.0897) (.8185) (.4832)
Difference crisis–
no-crisis
( p value) Negative (.2093) (.0340) (.0937) (.1582) (.0738) (.0897) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Positive (.3398) (.0812) (.0415) (.0003) (.0001) (.0009) (.0184) (<.0001) 7
7
1
C
o
rp
o
ra
te
F
in
a
n
cia
l
P
o
licies
a
n
d
P
erfo
rm
an
ce
#
0
4
4
0
9
U
C
P
:
B
N
a
rtic
le
#
7
7
0
4
0
4
TABLE 6 (Continued )
From (t ¼ 3) to
(t ¼ 1)
From (t ¼ 0) to
(t ¼ þ2)
Region
Exchange
Rate Beta N t ¼ 3 t ¼ 2 t ¼ 1 t ¼ 0 t ¼ þ1 t ¼ þ2 Change p Value Change p Value
Asian vs. Non-Asian Countries
Asian countries:
all Negative 2,642 22.81% 23.47% 23.55% 24.47% 20.49% 17.89% 3.63%*** (<.0001) 13.54%*** (<.0001)
Positive 1,734 21.27% 21.85% 21.22% 22.78% 20.47% 17.86% 1.11%*** (.0000) 8.98%*** (0.0023)
(.8920) (.3864) (.1437) (.2050) (.9595) (.8141) (.1064) (<.0001) (.7849)
Non-Asian
countries—all Negative 1,701 12.27% 11.03% 9.58% 9.34% 8.43% 8.01% 22.04%* (.0759) 11.75% (.3405)
Positive 418 12.25% 12.94% 12.18% 10.79% 9.14% 8.68% 9.42% (.6133) 13.13% (.7905)
(.2302) (.2649) (.0338) (.3530) (.3852) (.5103) (<.0001) (.0516)
Difference Asian–
non-Asian
( p value) Negative (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.1046) (.6063)
Positive (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.3262) (0321)
Note.—Median Short-Term Debt to Total Debt ratio. Short term debt refers to the portion of the debt repayable within one year. Tests of significance are based on a Wilcoxon
signed rank test. The third row in every panel is the p-value for a two tailed test of equal medians in negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. We also report the p-value for a
test of equality of medians crisis vs. no crisis sample, as well as Asian vs. non Asian countries.
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
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attention to just the crisis year, Asian firms clearly resort to more short-
term financing. Interestingly, the no-crisis sample also exhibits in-
creasing use of short-term debt prior to a crisis.
Our results concerning the increase in leverage are consistent with
Pomerleano (1998) and Harvey and Roper (1999). These authors also
document significant increases in short-term debt. Pomerleano (1998)
documents the rapidly increasing debt ratios in Asia, specially short-
term, from 1992 to 1996. Harvey and Roper (1999) report that the
median leverage ratio across the 261 firms in their sample was 68.6% in
1992 and 114% in 1996. The leverage increase was mostly short-term
again. We also document increases in short-term debt, especially for the
negative-exposure firms, but the magnitude of increase in our sample is
rather modest. However, during the crisis year, Asian firms clearly
exhibit a jump in the amount of short-term borrowing.
In Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (1998), Asian firms also display
increasing debt ratios, and their data suggest that the ratio of short-term
debt to total debt in the Asian economies was significantly larger than in
the United States or Germany (the median short-term debt share in-
creased from 47.26% in 1988 to 60.43% in 1996; this ratio is 25.9% in
1996 in the United States, 45.3% in Germany). Our evidence is con-
sistent with Claessens et al. (1998), since we also document that, in
Asia, the percentage of short-term debt relative to total debt was clearly
higher than in other regions.
In general, these results show that economies display increasing
corporate leverage prior to a currency depreciation, particularly among
companies that benefit from currency depreciations. The increase in
leverage is not due to a relatively higher increase in short-term bor-
rowing for European and Latin American companies. In addition, the
no-crisis sample demonstrates no increases in overall leverage prior to
the date of the currency attack, while there is an increase in the amount
of short-term debt used. So, what differentiates crisis and no-crisis
countries is not the changes in the amount of short-term debt but the
changes in the overall level of leverage.
The increase in leverage for negative-exposure companies prior to
a currency depreciation is consistent with Bris and Koskinen (2002),
whereas the increase in leverage after a currency depreciation, espe-
cially among the positive-exposure firms, is consistent with Aghion
et al. (2001). All in all, the results clearly show that firms in different
sectors of the economy show distinct patterns before and after a crisis
occurs. These patterns are consistent with Schneider and Tornell (2004),
to the extent that our classification of firms based on their ERBs cor-
responds to the classification of traded and nontraded sectors used by
Schneider and Tornell (2004).
In the next section, we analyze alternative measures of performance,
profitability, and investment.
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IV. Other Variables
A. Profitability
Harvey and Roper (1999), Claessens et al. (1998),and Pomerleano
(1998) report a significant decline in profitability in Asian economies
prior to the 1997 crisis (decreasing return on assets in Claessens et al.
1998; declining return on equity in Harvey and Roper 1999; and de-
creasing return on equity and return on capital employed in Pomerleano
1998). We want to examine whether this result extends to other regions
and whether it is uniform across firms with different exposure to ex-
change rate movements.
We obtain data on two measures of profitability (earnings before
interest and taxes over total revenues, or EBIT, and return on capital
employed). The results are in tables 7 and 8. We find significant
declines in profitability under both measures and in the three regions
under consideration for our crisis sample in the 2 years preceding
the crisis. For the overall crisis sample, the EBIT to revenues ratio
decreases for both negative- and positive-exposure companies the
2 years prior to a currency depreciation. The median decline is more
severe for negative-exposure firms (–30.05% for the negative-exposure
firms compared to 8.45% for the positive-exposure firms, signifi-
cantly different at the 1% level). This result carries over to Europe and
Asia, where the firms that have negative-exchange-rate betas have a
bigger decrease in median profitability (the difference is significant, at
least at the 5% level). In the control sample and for the Latin American
crisis sample, the positive-exposure firms show larger declines in EBIT
to revenues ratio in the 2 years prior to a crisis.
After the currency depreciation, profitability decreases only for the
positive-exposure firms in Europe and Latin America. Interestingly, this
result does not hold for Asia, where EBIT to revenues ratio declines
both for negative- and positive-exposure firms. The same results hold
for our control sample. Based on changes in EBIT to revenues ratios,
Asia is again different from other crisis regions: In Asia, all firms suffer
declining profitability, whereas elsewhere only the positive-ERB firms
show further decreases.
The other measure of profitability we use, the return on capital
employed (ROCE), confirms that profitability decreases in the 2 years
before a currency depreciation. In the overall crisis sample, both
negative- and positive-exposure companies exhibit declining profit-
ability, but again the negative-exposure firms suffer more (decreases
of 3.26% and 2.64%, respectively). Interestingly, now the control sam-
ple tells the opposite story: increase in ROCE for negative exposure
firms and no decline in ROCE for positive exposure firms in the 2
years prior to a crisis. Asian firms, both in the crisis sample alone
and grouped together with Hong Kong and Japan, clearly have lower
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TABLE 7 EBIT to Revenues Ratio
From (t ¼ 3) to
(t ¼ 1)
From (t ¼ 0) to
(t ¼ þ2)
Region
Exchange
Rate Beta N t ¼ 3 t ¼ 2 t ¼ 1 t ¼ 0 t ¼ þ1 t ¼ þ2 Change p Value Change p Value
Crisis vs. No-Crisis Countries
Crisis sample:
total Negative 2,114 9.51% 7.42% 6.72% 5.74% 5.87% 6.43% 30.05%*** (.0000) 5.80% (.2044)
Positive 904 11.59% 11.19% 10.28% 9.26% 7.71% 7.24% 8.45%*** (.0000) 20.07%*** (.0000)
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.0000)
Crisis sample:
Europe Negative 1,066 10.23% 7.80% 6.67% 5.62% 6.13% 6.71% 35.26%*** (<.0001) 8.03% (.3967)
Positive 242 10.26% 10.24% 9.24% 8.12% 7.53% 7.95% 17.12%*** (.0001) 13.52%*** (<.0001)
(.8057) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.0036) (.0164) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Crisis sample:
Asia Negative 967 8.66% 6.79% 6.71% 5.86% 5.69% 5.83% 25.39%*** (<.0001) 1.54%*** (.0056)
Positive 621 11.91% 11.71% 10.83% 9.80% 7.92% 6.52% 5.77%** (.0374) 30.08%*** (<.0001)
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.0798) (<.0001) (.0007)
Crisis sample:
Latin
America Negative 81 10.03% 8.17% 8.73% 6.62% 6.02% 7.90% 17.01%*** (.0002) 10.20% (.2617)
Positive 41 12.93% 11.36% 10.26% 9.55% 6.45% 9.95% 31.25%*** (.0091) 7.66% (.9949)
(.2047) (.1057) (.3501) (.1003) (.8794) (.3935) (.3153) (.4752)
No-crisis
sample: total Negative 856 3.23% 3.20% 3.38% 3.66% 2.98% 2.39% 9.43%*** (<.0001) 27.86%*** (<.0001)
Positive 466 3.13% 3.45% 3.42% 3.25% 2.53% 1.78% 18.37%*** (<.0001) 36.22%*** (<.0001)
(.3560) (.0705) (.7262) (.6976) (.1198) (.0633) (.0460) (.1233)
Difference
crisis–no-
crisis
( p value) Negative (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.0004) (.5994) (.1028) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Positive (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.4419) (.0001) (.0130) (.0105)
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TABLE 7 (Continued )
From (t ¼ 3) to
(t ¼ 1)
From (t ¼ 0) to
(t ¼ þ2)
Region
Exchange
Rate Beta N t ¼ 3 t ¼ 2 t ¼ 1 t ¼ 0 t ¼ þ1 t ¼ þ2 Change p Value Change p Value
Asian vs. Non-Asian Countries
Asian countries:
all Negative 1,846 11.39% 10.45% 9.33% 8.18% 7.52% 8.44% 18.85%*** (<.0001) 18.74%*** (<.0001)
Positive 1,103 6.83% 7.56% 7.46% 6.50% 4.83% 3.10% 10.05%*** (<.0001) 33.36%*** (<.0001)
(<.0001) (<.0001) (.0012) (.0475) (.0002) (<.0001) (.3361) (.0005)
Non Asian
countries: all Negative 1,167 10.23% 7.84% 6.73% 5.64% 6.16% 6.89% 33.72%*** (<.0001) 8.56% (.2478)
Positive 297 5.53% 5.02% 5.03% 4.72% 3.87% 3.27% 17.82%*** (<.0001) 11.63%*** (<.0001)
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.0112) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.0000)
Difference Asian–
non-Asian
( p value) Negative (.3191) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.0061) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Positive (.0016) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.5981) (.0205) (.0009)
Note.—Median EBIT to Revenues Ratio Tests significance are based on a Wilcoxon signed rank test. The third row in every panel is the p-value for a two tailed test of equal
medians in negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. We also report the p-value for a test of equality of medians crisis vs. no crisis sample, as well as Asian vs. non Asian
countries.
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
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TABLE 8 Return on Capital Employed
From (t = 3) to
(t = 1)
From (t = 0) to
(t = þ 2)
Region
Exchange
Rate Beta N t = 3 t = 2 t = 1 t = 0 t = þ 1 t = þ 2 Change p Value Change p Value
Crisis vs. No-Crisis Countries
Crisis sample:
total Negative 2,058 13.37% 11.86% 10.23% 8.59% 7.57% 8.50% 3.26%*** (<.0001) .76%*** (<.0001)
Positive 857 11.76% 10.49% 10.12% 8.27% 6.90% 6.54% 2.64%*** (<.0001) 1.91%*** (<.0001)
(.0361) (.0390) (.9594) (.3724) (.3866) (.0004) (.0447) (.0042)
Crisis sample:
Europe Negative 1,131 19.89% 17.77% 14.51% 12.00% 11.25% 11.91% 5.71%*** (<.0001) .14% (.8103)
Positive 262 18.04% 16.64% 13.92% 12.16% 11.91% 11.63% 4.61%*** (<.0001) .46% (.6075)
(.7453) (.7472) (.3705) (.6772) (.1228) (.7358) (.2463) (.6840)
Crisis sample:
Asia Negative 869 7.57% 7.97% 7.73% 6.41% 4.62% 4.24% 1.43%*** (<.0001) 2.33%*** (<.0001)
Positive 567 9.66% 9.06% 8.63% 7.29% 5.47% 4.14% 1.99%*** (<.0001) 3.50%*** (<.0001)
(<.0001) (.0001) (<.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.3237) (.1249) (.3726)
Crisis sample:
Latin
America Negative 58 17.32% 15.07% 12.24% 10.85% 7.59% 11.08% 5.29%*** (.0001) .44% (.6695)
Positive 28 17.24% 19.33% 17.44% 9.72% 4.12% 10.61% 1.42% (.7969) 2.18% (.4964)
(.7898) (.6064) (.0488) (.9118) (.8443) (.7575) (.3370) (.2902)
No-crisis
sample: total Negative 717 4.47% 4.60% 4.72% 5.21% 4.63% 3.68% .59%** (.0145) 1.68%*** (<.0001)
Positive 397 5.05% 5.23% 4.56% 4.88% 3.95% 2.84% .01% .4023 2.82%*** (<.0001)
(.1391) (.2147) (.8538) (.3576) (.0149) (.0002) (.0517) (<.0001)
Difference
crisis-No-
crisis ( p value) Negative (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Positive (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 7
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TABLE 8 (Continued )
From (t ¼ 3) to
(t ¼ 1)
From (t ¼ 0) to
(t ¼ þ2)
Region
Exchange
Rate Beta N t ¼ 3 t ¼ 2 t ¼ 1 t ¼ 0 t ¼ þ1 t ¼ þ2 Change p Value Change p Value
Asian vs. Non-Asian Countries
Asian countries:
all Negative 1,196 6.27% 6.74% 6.28% 5.91% 4.62% 3.88% .38%*** (<.0001) 1.86%*** (<.0001)
Positive 294 7.03% 7.36% 6.93% 6.31% 4.83% 3.38% .85%*** (<.0001) 3.03%*** (<.0001)
(.0034) (.0031) (.0018) (.0131) (.0949) (.1683) (.0528) (.0014)
Non-Asian
countries: all Negative 1,579 19.65% 17.61% 14.30% 11.87% 10.89% 11.89% 5.69%*** (<.0001) .18% (.7758)
Positive 960 18.01% 16.63% 14.14% 12.20% 11.20% 11.53% 4.55%*** (<.0001) .36% (.6257)
(.8179) (.7860) (.1275) (.5788) (.4461) (.9209) (.1821) (.7361)
Difference Asian-
Non-Asian
( p value) Negative (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Positive (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.0007) (<.0001)
Note.—Median Return on Capital Emplyed (ROCE). Tests of significance are based on a Wilcoxon signed rank test. The third row in every panel is the p-value for a two tailed test
of equal medians in negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. We also report the p-value for a test of equality of medians crisis vs. no crisis sample, as well as Asian vs. non
Asian countries.
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
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profitability than European and Latin American firms both before and
after the crises.
After currency depreciation, we observe no improvement in ROCE
for the overall crisis sample. This result is, however, due to adverse
development in Asia after the crisis, consistent with the previous result
using EBIT to revenues ratio as a measure of profitability. After a
currency depreciation, the profitability of all firms in Asia declines no
matter what the measure. The same is true for the control sample. In
Europe and Latin America, there is no significant change in ROCE
after the currency depreciations. These results confirm that the Asian
crisis is different from the European and Latin American ones. Further
declines in Asia for all firms, but in Europe and Latin America, only the
positive-ERB firms have declining profitability if EBIT to revenues is
used as the measure. If ROCE is used as a measure of profitability, then
neither negative- nor positive-exposure firms in Europe and Latin
America show further decreases in profitability.
B. Financial Fragility
Radelet and Sachs (1998) blame financial panic as a cause of the
East Asia crises of 1997. They identify the ratio of short-term debt to
foreign exchange reserves as an indicator of a country’s risk. Radelet
and Sachs (1998) report that this ratio was above 1 for Indonesia,
Thailand, and South Korea prior to 1997. However, it was also below 1
for some other countries affected by the crises, such as Taiwan and the
Philippines.
We study financial fragility in a similar fashion to Radelet and Sachs
(1998), except that we use firm-level data. In our analysis, the current
ratio measures the ability of a creditor to pay off its short-term debts.
The current ratio is calculated as current assets to current liabilities, and
it reflects the current liquidity of the firm. Pomerleano (1998) argues
that this would be a good measure of a firm’s financial fragility, al-
though the ratio is not reported in his study.
We report in table 9 the current ratio for 2994 firms in our crisis
sample and 1304 firms in our control sample. The evolution of the
current ratio differs across firms, depending on their currency exposure.
While negative-exposure firms decrease their current ratio by 5.00%
(significant at the 1% level), the change for positive exposure is insig-
nificant for the overall crisis sample. The evidence differs somewhat,
depending on the crisis region: For all the regions, negative-exposure
companies have a significant decline in current ratio, but for positive-
exposure firms, the evidence is divergent. In Europe, the positive-ERB
firms exhibit even greater decline in current ratio than the negative ones,
whereas in Latin America the positive-exposure firms become less
fragile. For the control sample, the decline in the current ratio is about
the same for all firms. It is interesting to note that- for the United States,
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TABLE 9 Current Ratio
From (t ¼ 3) to
(t ¼ 1)
From (t ¼ 0) to
(t ¼ þ2)
Region
Exchange
Rate Beta N t ¼ 3 t ¼ 2 t ¼ 1 t ¼ 0 t ¼ þ1 t ¼ þ2 Change p Value Change p Value
Crisis vs. no-crisis countries
Crisis sample:
total Negative 2,049 1.40 1.39 1.33 1.32 1.25 1.27 5.00%*** (<.0001) 3.00% (<.0001)
Positive 945 1.34 1.38 1.40 1.38 1.22 1.21 2.00% (.1718) 11.00% (<.0001)
(.0794) (.4834) (.0325) (.0181) (.9307) (.0564) (.2261) (.0005)
Crisis sample:
Europe Negative 1,019 1.39 1.34 1.32 1.34 1.35 1.37 4.00%*** (.0009) 1.00% (.2991)
Positive 235 1.43 1.36 1.33 1.29 1.32 1.41 8.00%*** (.0011) 6.00% (.0226)
(.6215) (.7654) (.7256) (.2417) (.5769) (.5310) (.0684) (.0810)
Crisis sample:
Asia Negative 952 1.38 1.43 1.36 1.29 1.13 1.12 6.00%*** (.0002) 12.00% (<.0001)
Positive 673 1.32 1.38 1.41 1.44 1.17 1.07 1.00% (.8083) 23.00% (<.0001)
(.1232) (.9284) (.0843) (.0011) (.0662) (.5809) (.0551) (.0021)
Crisis sample:
Latin
America Negative 78 1.66 1.65 1.49 1.56 1.35 1.44 18.000%*** (.0013) 10.00% (.0078)
Positive 37 1.36 1.61 1.72 1.49 1.43 1.69 28.00%** (.0362) 8.00% (.8344)
(.0567) (.9314) (.0688) (.4607) (.1031) (.0966) (.0006) (.1393)
No-crisis
sample: total Negative 825 1.39 1.36 1.33 1.31 1.28 1.33 5.00%*** (<.0001) 3.00% (<.0001)
Positive 479 1.30 1.28 1.26 1.24 1.22 1.25 4.00%*** (<.0001) .00% (.8523)
(.0053) (.0227) (.0154) (.0616) (.0242) (.0052) (.8064) (.0050)
Difference
crisis-no
crisis
( p value) Negative (.1008) (.5709) (.9428) (.6657) (.0004) (<.0001) (.2128) (<.0001)
Positive (.9810) (.0352) (.0002) (.0034) (.5688) (.0707) (.0419) (<.0001)
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From (t ¼ 3) to
(t ¼ 1)
From (t ¼ 0) to
(t ¼ þ2)
Region
Exchange
Rate Beta N t ¼ 3 t ¼ 2 t ¼ 1 t ¼ 0 t ¼ þ1 t ¼ þ2 Change p Value Change p Value
Asian vs. Non-Asian Countries
Asian countries:
all Negative 1,768 1.41 1.36 1.32 1.36 1.35 1.37 5.00%*** (<.0001) 2.00% (0.0388)
Positive 1,148 1.42 1.40 1.39 1.33 1.33 1.45 3.00%*** (.0006) 7.00% (<.0001)
1,106 (.1106) (.4970) (.8530) (.5620) (.0124) (<.0001) (.1742) (<.0001)
Non-Asian
countries: all Negative 276 1.38 1.39 1.34 1.30 1.20 1.24 5.00%*** (.0001) .00%* (.8360)
Positive 1.31 1.33 1.35 1.34 1.20 1.16 6.00%** (.0318) 6.00% (.0503)
(.9084) (.0436) (.5296) (.1276) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.5516) (.0670)
Difference Asian-
Non-Asian
( p value) Negative (.7573) (.3505) (.4908) (.5925) (.8872) (.2150) (.0820) (.1177)
Positive (.0024) (.1045) (.9580) (.1376) (.7703) (.0141) (.6095) (<.0001)
Note.—Median Current Assets to Current Liabilities Ratio. Tests of significance are based on a Wilcoxon signed rank test. The third row in every panel is the p-value for a two
tailed test of equal medians in negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. We also report the p-value for a test of equality of medians crisis vs. no crisis sample, as well as Asian
vs. non Asian countries.
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
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the current ratio for the total sample of Compustat firms (5108 firms
with data available) in the years 1995–1998 is respectively 3.29, 3.70,
4.04, and 3.34, considerably higher than either in our crisis or control
samples.
Interestingly, for 2 years after the crisis, the current ratio still de-
clined for Asian firms (a decline of 12.00% for the negative-exposure
firms and 23.00% for the positive-exposure firms, both significant at
the 1% level), whereas in Europe the positive-ERB firms show in-
creasing current ratio and in Latin America only the negative-exposure
firms decreased their current ratios. This is further evidence that the
Asian firms have been slower in their recovery than European and Latin
American firms.
Table 10 complements the previous result. We display the interest
coverage ratios for the firms in the sample and find a clear deterioration in
solvency for both negative- and positive-exposure firms prior to the onset
of the corresponding crisis. The interest coverage ratio is calculated as
EBITDA divided by interest expense, where EBITDA are the company’s
earnings before total interest expense, depreciation, amortization, and
provisions. For the overall crisis sample, negative-exchange-rate-beta
firms experienced a decrease of 40.25% in their interest coverage ratio,
while firms with a positive-exchange-rate betas decreased their interest
coverage ratio by 30.79%, both coefficients significantly different from
zero at 1% level. For European firms, the change in interest coverage
ratio declined for both types of firms (50.47% change for negative-
exposure firms and 44.42% change for the positive-exposure firms,
both significant at the 1% level). For Asian firms, the negative-exposure
firms show a significant decline in interest coverage (a decrease of
7.09%, significant at the 1% level). It is especially interesting to observe
that the level of interest coverage was very low for Asian firms already
several years before the onset of the crisis, especially for the negative-
ERB firms. Also noteworthy is the observation that, in our control
sample, positive-exposure firms significantly increased their interest
coverage ratios prior to the attacks (an increase of 11.18% for positive
exposure firms, significant at the 1% level).
For European firms, the interest coverage ratio increased signifi-
cantly (an increase of 8.56% for the negative-ERB firms) during the
2 years following the currency crisis, while for the Asian firms, the
interest coverage ratio declined even further (a decline of 35.80% for
negative-exposure firms and 45.07% for the positive-exposure firms,
both significant at the 1% level). Analysis of the interest coverage ratio
further confirms the special characteristics of the Asian crisis with
respect to the turbulences in Europe and Latin America. Moreover,
interest coverage is markedly lower in Asia during the 6 years that we
study compared to Europe and Latin America. After 2 years following
the onset of the crisis, interest coverage was below 1 for negative-ERB
782 Journal of Business
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TABLE 10 Interest Coverage
From (t ¼ 3) to
(t ¼ 1)
From (t ¼ 0) to
(t ¼ þ2)
Region
Exchange
Rate Beta N t ¼ 3 t ¼ 2 t ¼ 1 t ¼ 0 t ¼ þ1 t ¼ þ2 Change p Value Change p Value
Crisis vs. No-Crisis Countries
Crisis sample:
total Negative 1,581 4.85 3.42 2.37 1.93 1.77 2.46 40.25%*** (<.0001) 3.81% (.2077)
Positive 447 4.01 3.62 3.22 2.92 2.67 2.72 30.79%*** (<.0001) 19.81%** (.0124)
(.0973) (.6530) (.0059) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.4445) (.1033) (.1161)
Crisis sample:
Europe Negative 1,094 7.23 4.94 3.60 3.10 3.15 4.36 50.47%*** (<.0001) 8.58%*** (.0042)
Positive 216 6.27 4.48 3.75 3.48 2.96 3.84 44.42%*** (<.0001) 7.27% (.1957)
(.3985) (.6258) (.2960) (.6950) (.6075) (.2241) (.4189) (.9912)
Crisis sample:
Asia Negative 401 1.11 1.14 1.04 0.93 0.88 0.73 7.09%*** (.0006) 35.80%*** (<.0001)
Positive 198 2.00 3.16 3.20 2.75 2.63 1.41 5.725 (.9811) 45.07%*** (<.0001)
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.2864) (.9027)
Crisis sample:
Latin
America Negative 86 3.23 3.33 2.33 1.65 1.18 1.91 28.10%* (.0575) 3.98% (.7316)
Positive 33 2.66 2.12 2.36 1.99 2.08 3.07 30.90% (.1886) 9.48% (.6435)
(.3429) (.0285) (.5512) (.0497) (.0037) (.0079) (.5330) (.6849)
No-Crisis
sample: total Negative 583 5.38 5.79 8.63 11.20 9.08 3.16 11.18%*** (.0009) 57.97%*** (<.0001)
Positive 267 3.31 3.91 5.24 7.81 6.60 2.34 3.65% (.6544) 66.87%*** (<.0001)
(.0034) (.0371) (.0024) (.0083) (.00104) (.1681) (.1719) (.1926)
Difference
crisis: No-
Crisis
( p value) Negative (.1399) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.1042) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Positive (.0973) (.6530) (.0059) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.4445) (.0007) (<.0001)
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TABLE 10 (Continued )
From (t ¼ 3) to
t ¼ 1
From (t ¼ 0) to
t ¼ þ2
Region
Exchange
Rate Beta N t ¼ 3 t ¼ 2 t ¼ 1 t ¼ 0 t ¼ þ1 t ¼ þ2 Change p Value Change p Value
Asian vs. Non-Asian Countries
Asian countries:
all Negative 976 1.84 1.89 1.90 2.28 1.68 1.19 .06% (.5006) 49.58%*** (<.0001)
Positive 460 2.68 3.58 4.05 4.06 3.52 1.80 .02% (.8293) 55.03%*** (<.0001)
(<.0001) (0.2622) (.8103) (.0147) (.0071) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Non-Asian
countries: all Negative 1,188 6.91 4.75 3.43 2.96 2.87 4.04 48.56%*** (<.0001) 7.61%*** (.0097)
Positive 284 5.68 3.98 3.45 3.16 2.70 3.42 42.02%*** (<.0001) 6.68% (.1984)
(<.0001) (<.0001) (.0002) (.3022) (.3011) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Difference Asian:
Non-Asian
(p value) Negative (.0658) (.0865) (.2453) (.3980) (.8811) (.5118) (.2016) (.9428)
Positive (.0485) (.0000) (.0000) (.0015) (<.0001) (.0060) (.9237) (.4001)
Note.—Median EBITDA to Interest Expense, where EBITDA are the company’s earnings before total interest expense, depereciation, amortization and provisions. Tests of
significance are based on a Wilcoxon signed rank test. The third row in every panel is the p-value for a two tailed test of equal medians in negative and positive exchange rate beta
firms. We also report the p-value but a test of equality of median crisis vs. no crisis sample, as well as Asian vs. non Asian countries.
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
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firms in Asia. This implies that Asian companies did not earn enough
revenue to cover their interest expenses.
C. Investments
We analyzed the investment policies in our sample of firms from three
different regions by obtaining data on changes in total assets. We
define net investments as the ratio of changes in total assets relative to
total assets in the previous period. In Table 11, we summarize changes
in net investments for a period of 6 years.
Overall in our crisis sample, negative-ERB companies invest less
than they did before the onset of a currency crisis. (a decline of 7.10%,
significant at the 1% level), whereas there is no change for the positive-
ERB companies. In our control sample, both negative- and positive-
exposure firms increased their investments. Among the regions in our
crisis sample, Asia stands out once more: Both types of firms increased
their investments in the 2 years before the crisis (increases of 4.88%
and 2.25% for negative- and positive-exposure firms, respectively).
Moreover, the investment levels for Asian firms are high until the
crisis. In this respect, Asia is different from Europe and Latin America.
Claessens et al. (1998) report, in line with our results, relatively higher
investment rates (measured as new dollar investments as a share of
existing fixed assets) in Asian firms than in U.S. and German firms.
Consistent with Schneider and Tornell’s (2001) model, the positive-
exposure firms grow more in the years preceding a currency crisis in all
the regions.
Asian investment patterns differ from those of Europe and Latin
America also after the currency depreciations. Both negative- and
positive-ERB firms in Asia showed decreases in the investment rate
after the crisis. Two years after the crisis, the negative exposure firms
in Asia are actually downsizing, not just growing at a slower rate. In
Europe and Latin America, the negative-ERB firms increased their
investment rates.
D. Summary of the Findings
Our analysis suggests that firms in countries that suffered dramatic
exchange rate depreciations in the last decade follow a similar pattern
of financial policies prior to a currency crisis. We documented sig-
nificant increases in leverage in the 2 years preceding a currency
depreciation. These increases in leverage are greater for negative-
exposure firms in our crisis sample, whereas for the control sample,
the opposite holds. We also showed a decline in profitability in the
corporate sector. The decline is sharper for the firms with negative
exposure to exchange rate movements. Again, the evidence for the
control sample is very different. The major difference between Asian
785Corporate Financial Policies and Performance
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TABLE 11 Net Investment
From (t ¼ 3) to
(t ¼ 1)
From (t ¼ 0) to
(t ¼ þ2)
Region
Exchange
Rate Beta N t ¼ 3 t ¼ 2 t ¼ 1 t ¼ 0 t ¼ þ1 t ¼ þ2 Change p Value Change p Value
Crisis vs. No-Crisis Countries
Crisis sample:
total Negative 2,479 16.41% 14.99% 9.75% 6.59% 7.58% 2.56% 7.10%*** (<.0001) 4.34%*** (<.0001)
Positive 1,069 14.05% 17.75% 16.61% 13.72% 16.59% 4.71% .62% (.3058) 8.38%*** (<.0001)
(.1537) (.0003) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.0002) (.0000) (.0001)
Crisis sample:
Europe Negative 1,150 21.49% 15.66% 2.20% .61% 3.81% 5.75% 20.13%*** (<.0001) 3.56%*** (<.0001)
Positive 240 25.37% 19.28% 9.13% 6.09% 7.23% 8.46% 18.08%*** (<.0001) 3.64%** (.0290)
(.3420) (.0061) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.0011) (.1264) (.7019)
Crisis sample:
Asia Negative 1,236 10.64% 14.60% 15.82% 12.61% 10.91% .95% 4.88%*** (<.0001) 14.18%*** (<.0001)
Positive 787 11.39% 17.67% 18.07% 15.10% 19.49% 3.33% 2.25%** (.0161) 13.41%*** (<.0001)
(.8721) (.0329) (.0109) (.0002) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.5548) (.4787)
Crisis sample:
Latin
America Negative 93 16.51% 12.77% 8.04% 0.64% 9.14% 4.52% 2.01% (.2403) 6.71%** (.0107)
Positive 42 25.14% 11.34% 18.10% 9.18% 14.60% 5.98% 15.23% (.6875) 4.67% (.2000)
(.0023) (.0711) (.0026) (.0006) (.0279) (.3665) (.4375) (.7998)
No-crisis
sample: total Negative 1,141 .74% 2.04% 3.10% 2.64% .20% 2.18% 3.56%*** (<.0001) 4.98%*** (<.0001)
Positive 618 2.03% 2.98% 2.69% 2.61% .03% 2.49% 3.24%*** (<.0001) 4.29%*** (<.0001)
(.0033) (.0028) (.1629) (.6918) (.8056) (.4315) (.6475) (.2219)
Difference
Crisis—No
Crisis
( p-value) Negative (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.1596)
Positive
(<.0001)
(<0.0001)
(<.0001)
(<0.0001)
(<.0001)
(<0.0001)
(<.0001)
(<0.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.0021) (.0009)
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From (t ¼ 3) to
(t ¼ 1)
From (t ¼ 0) to
(t ¼ þ2)
Region
Exchange
Rate Beta N t ¼ 3 t ¼ 2 t ¼ 1 t ¼ 0 t ¼ þ1 t ¼ þ2 Change p Value Change p Value
Asian vs. Non-Asian Countries
Asian countries:
all Negative 2,461 3.22% 6.68% 7.79% 6.30% 3.58% 1.80% 3.93%*** (<.0001) 7.60%*** (<.0001)
Positive 1,567 1.78% 8.05% 9.11% 8.62% 7.79% .35% 3.07%*** (<.0001) 7.25%*** (<.0001)
(<.0001) (<.0001) (.5500) (.1293) (.7254) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.0000)
Non Asian
countries: all Negative 1,280 21.39% 15.48% 2.83% .61% 4.29% 5.49% 19.21%*** (.0000) 3.82%*** (.0000)
Positive 313 25.37% 17.48% 9.40% 6.27% 7.23% 8.22% 18.08%*** (.0000) 3.58%** (.0247)
(<.0001) (<.0001)
(<.0001)
(<0.001) (<.0001) (.0241) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Difference Asian-
Non-Asian
( p value) Negative (.0695) (.0013) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.0013) (.0661) (.3039)
Positive (.0026) (.0009) (.0139) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.3105) (.8122)
Note.—Median Net Investment. Net Investment is defined as the ratio of the change in total assets to total assets. Tests of significance are based on a Wilcoxon signed rank test.
The third row in every panel is the p-value for a two-tailed test of equal medians in negative and positive exchange rate beta forms. We also report the p-value for a test of equality
of medians crisis vs. no crisis sample, as well as Asian vs. non Asian countries.
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
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companies and other companies in the precrisis period is that Asian
companies kept on investing a lot.
We can document significant differences across regions in the years
following a currency depreciation. In Europe and Latin America, the
performance of negative-ERB firms improved or at least did not get any
worse, while in Asia, the performance of all firms were worse after the
onset of the crisis. The evidence in Europe fits quite well with the
predictions of Bris and Koskinen (2002), whereas the implications of
Aghion et al. (2001) are more consistent with the Asian evidence.
Overall, the evidence gives support to the Schneider and Tornell (2004)
model to the extent that firms with negative- and positive-exchange rate
exposures correspond to firms in tradable and nontradable sectors.
Next we study cross-sectionally the determinants of a firm leverage
prior to the currency crises.
V. Cross-Sectional Analysis on Firm Leverage
We complete the analysis by testing whether firms’ leverage prior to
a currency depreciation can be explained partially by their exposure
to currency movements. If financial distress is likely to induce a gov-
ernment to let the currency depreciate as a way of bailing out com-
panies, as postulated by Bris and Koskinen (2002), then we should
expect firms that benefit the most from a currency depreciation to have
a higher leverage than companies that suffer from depreciation prior to
a currency crisis. So far, we have showed, in a simple time-series
framework, that negative-exposure companies increase their leverage
more than positive-exposure companies. At the same time, we know
that negative-exposure-firm profitability declines more than positive-
exposure-firm profitability during the precrisis period. Hence, the
increasing leverage for negative-exposure firms could be just an ac-
counting artifact, resulting from accumulating losses. Studying lever-
age in a cross-sectional regression allows us to control for profitability
and other firm-specific characteristics, and as a result, we can get a more
reliable evidence about the role of currency exposure in determining the
leverage choices of the firms.
We performed cross-sectional regression analyses at the firm level,
where the dependent variable is the firm’s debt-to-value ratio (book
values) as of December prior to the corresponding currency crisis. The
set of explanatory variables includes the firm’s exchange rate beta,
calculated over a window of t ¼ 6 to t ¼ 24 months relative to the
event month. We construct a dummy variable Ii that takes value 1 if the
corresponding firm i belongs to the crisis sample, and 0 if it belongs to
the control sample. We then decomposed the effect of the exchange rate
beta into two groups, depending on the dummy variable. The first
component equals Iih xi described in table 12 as Exchange rate beta,
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TABLE 12 Firm Leverage and Currency Exposure
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Variable Estimate p Value Estimate p Value Estimate p Value Estimate p Value
Intercept .1727 (.1178)
Exchange rate
beta, crisis sample .0229%*** (<.0001) .0210*** (.0094) .0237*** (.0043) .0241*** (.0059)
Exchange rate
beta, no-crisis sample .0007 (.7137) .1211*** (.0041) .1396*** (.0012) .1382*** (.0014)
Firm size .0231*** (<.0001) 1.0163*** (<.0001) .0229*** (<.0001) .0234*** (<.0001)
EBIT=total assets .0101 (.3309) .0056*** (.0027) .0082*** (<.0001) .0097*** (<.0001)
Market-to-book ratio .0002 (.2391) .0001 (.4968) .0002 (.4073) .0001 (.4236)
Corruption index
(lower score,
high corruption) .0242 (.5926) .1855*** (.0003) .1349* (.0505)
Efficiency of
judicial system .0043 0.0043 (.6981) .0152 (.1686) .0170 (.1711)
Enforceability of contracts .1148** (.0104) .0572 (.3056) .1682* (.0830)
Log GDP per capita .0196 (.4428) .1065*** (<.0001) .0981** (.0136)
Risk of expropriation
(lower score, high risk) .0185 (.6553) 4818*** (<.0001) .2916*** (.0070)
Government repudiation
of contracts (lower score,
high risk) .0750*** (.0001) .0211 (.2323) .1217*** (.0001)
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TABLE 12 (Continued )
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Variable Estimate p Value Estimate p Value Estimate p Value Estimate p Value
Rule of Law .0012 (.9597) .1201*** (.0005) .0271 (.4502)
Dummy for
Asian countries .0929*** (.0001) .2213*** (<.0001)
Dummy for
European countries .2355*** (.0002) .2812*** (.0004)
Dummy for Latin
American countries .5982*** (<.0001) .6034*** (<.0001)
Legal mother is Germany .3281*** (.0001)
Legal Mother is
France and Spain .1586 (.1903)
Legal mother is
United Kingdom .1050** (.0136)
Number of observations 3211 2972. 2970 2967
R square .963 .086 .574 .575
Note.—This table reports the results of the regression of a firm’s debt-to-value ration on the variables listed under the variables column for countries that have suffered a
currency crises in the period 1985–2000. The debt-to-value ratio is calculated dividing total debt by the sum of total debt plus the book value of equity. The variables ‘‘Exchange
Rate Beta—Crisis Sample’’ and ‘‘Exchange Rate Beta—No Crisis Sample’’ are dummy variables that equal the Exchange Rate Beta of the firm in question or zero, depending on
whether the firm belongs to a country in crisis or the non-crisis sample, respectively. Exchange rates and accounting variables are from Datastream. The corporate governance
variables are from La Porta et al. (1998). P-values have been corrected for heteroskedasticity following the approach in White (1980). All R-squares are adjusted Model I is
estimated with country-fixed effects.
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
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crisis sample. The second component equals 1 Iið Þh x2 described as
Exchange rate beta, no-crisis sample. The procedure allows us to dis-
entangle the effect of the exchange rate regime in a joint estimation.
La Porta et al. (1998) argue that laws affecting investor protection
have consequences for corporate finance. We therefore control in our
analysis for differences in efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law,
corruption, and risk of expropriation across countries. The variables
reported in La Porta et al. (1998) are averages calculated over different
time horizons, so their interpretation must be taken with caution. For
instance, the efficiency of the judiciary system is calculated by La Porta
et al. (1998) as the average between 1980 and 1993, while the start of
currency crises we consider dates from 1992. In our regressions, we
therefore employ the complete time series of data that La Porta et al.
use in their paper,
20
and calculate when possible the 5-year average
prior to the corresponding currency crisis date. Comparing the mean
values of the variables in our sample with all the countries considered
by La Porta et al. (1998) we observe no dramatic differences (the mean
values for the variables Efficiency of the judicial system, Rule of Law,
Corruption, and Risk of expropriation are 7.10, 6.78, 6.59, and 7.96 for
our sample and 7.67, 6.85, 6.9, and 8.05, for a total sample of 49
countries in La Porta et al.).
Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that highly levered companies are
more likely to give up profitable investment opportunities. Hence,
growth opportunities (using the market value of assets divided by the
book value of assets as a proxy) should be negatively related to debt-
to-equity ratios. We calculate the average market-to-book ratio in the
3 years preceding the currency crises for 3211 firms in our sample. In
Rajan and Zingales (1995), size is measured by the logarithm of sales.
They obtain a positive coefficient in their regressions, although, in their
view, a negative relationship between size and debt levels is sensible if
size is also a proxy for the information outside investors have. Our
measure of size is a 3-year average of a firm’s sales before the relevant
currency depreciation. Additionally, Rajan and Zingales (1995) find a
negative relationship between earnings (earnings before interest, taxes,
and depreciation normalized by the book value of assets) and book
debt-to-value ratios. Our measure of profitability is EBIT normalized
by total assets. We further control for the log of the GDP per capita in
dollars. In addition, in Model I we also employ firm-level fixed effects.
The results from the regression are reported in table 12. For the total
sample, we find results consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1995),
since profitability and size have, respectively, negative and positive
coefficients in general. Contrary to Rajan and Zingales (1995), the
20. We are grateful to Florencio López de Silanes for providing us with this unpublished
data.
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market-to-book ratio is never significant in our cross-sectional re-
gressions. Focusing on the coefficient for the exchange rate beta, we
consistently find a negative relationship between a firm’s exposure to
exchange rate movements and book leverage for the firms in our crisis
sample. The opposite holds for the firms in the control sample. This
means that negative-exposure firms have higher leverage than positive
exposure firms for our crisis sample, even when we control for the
relevant firm characteristics. This finding is consistent with the argu-
ments in Bris and Koskinen (2002). We also find that some corporate
governance variables help explain leverage, albeit sometimes the
coefficients are not significant. The corruption index and risk of ex-
propriation get negative coefficients, which are to be expected: High
corruption and high risk of expropriation lead to increasing leverage.
VI. Conclusions
This paper uses company-level data from 17 countries that experienced
a currency crisis during the past decade. We also include data from three
control countries, whose currencies were under attack but remained
quite stable. First, we studied leverage on the company-level before and
after the currency crises. We documented increasing leverage before the
onset of the crises for Europe, Asia, and Latin America. After the re-
spective crises, we show that leverage further increases in Asia and
Latin America but not in Europe. Furthermore, the increasing leverage
during the pre- and postcrisis periods is confined to the countries forced
to devalue their currencies during the crisis.
Next, we sort companies into two groups, depending on whether they
benefited from or were harmed by currency appreciations. The sorting is
done using companies’ individual stock returns regressed on the home
currency’s movement against the U.S. dollar and on the part of market
return orthogonal to the currency movement. Using this grouping, we
show that there are differences in companies’ leverage and profitability
depending on their exchange rate exposure in our crisis sample. While
leverage increases and profitability declines for all companies, these
effects are more pronounced for negative-exchange-rate-exposure
companies. We find the opposite for our control sample. Moreover,
there are clear differences between the regions. For the European firms
that have negative-exchange-rate exposure, we document that leverage
increases and profitability decreases before the crisis, but the financial
health of these companies improves after the crisis. Therefore, there is
evidence that currency depreciations helped the European negative-
exposure companies. For Asian firms, leverage increases and profit-
ability decreases both before and after the currency depreciations, albeit
the negative-exposure companies suffer more during the precrisis pe-
riod and less during the postcrisis period.We can conclude that currency
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depreciations did not help improve the financial health of Asian
companies. The evidence for Latin America is mixed, and the Latin
American situation lays somewhere between the European and Asian
ones. Regarding financial fragility, we find that all firms in our crisis
sample become more fragile before the onset of the crisis. Interestingly,
there is evidence that again the Asian crisis differs from crises in Europe
and Latin America: Firms in Asia became even more fragile after the
crises, especially when the negative-exposure firms in Europe and Latin
America start to recover. In addition, net investments also confirm that
the Asian crisis was different. In Asia, investments increased prior to the
crisis and declined afterward, while the patterns are the opposite for
Europe and Latin America.
The time-series evidence documented could be partially a result of
accounting identities resulting from low or even negative profitability.
Hence, the time-series evidence does not prove any kind of strategic
behavior on the part of the negative-exchange-rate-exposure firms. We
address this problem in a cross-sectional regression controlling for firm
characteristics, including profitability. We find that the firms with
negative-exchange-rate exposures have higher leverage prior to a crisis
than firms that have positive-exchange-rate betas. The results of higher
leverage, higher financial fragility, and lower profitability for negative-
exposure companies are consistent with the arguments in Bris and
Koskinen (2002), whereas the evidence that all kinds of firms suffer
from these problems is consistent with Aghion et al. (2001). The results
of recovery among negative-exposure firms, especially in Europe,
show that currency depreciations have helped solve balance sheet
problems, as argued by Bris and Koskinen (2002). We also provide
evidence from Asia consistent with Aghion et al. (2001): All firms
in Asia have lower profitability and are more fragile even after a
currency depreciation. In all the crisis regions, we established that,
prior to the crises, the positive-exposure firms fared better than the
negative-exposure firms and the roles were reversed after the crises.
This asymmetrical pattern is consistent with Schneider and Tornell
(2004), if our classification of firms to negative- and positive-exposure
firms corresponds to the firms belonging to the tradable and non-
tradable sectors. Also, the observation that positive-exposure compa-
nies grow faster than negative-exposure companies is in accordance
with Schneider and Tornell (2004).
The evidence that negative exposure firms suffer more prior to
currency crises is also consistent with Aghion et al. (2001). In that
paper, the declining profits for firms that produce a tradable good is due
to increasing costs not firm-level strategic behavior, as in Bris and
Koskinen (2002). However, the evidence that negative-exposure firms
increase their leverage more than declining profits would dictate hints
at strategic behavior by the firms.
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The results provided in this paper could also be consistent with the
corporate governance explanations explored by Johnson et al. (2000),
Lemmon and Lins (2003), and Mitton (2002). These papers show,
providing either country- or firm-level evidence, that the magnitude of
the crisis was negatively related to corporate governance measures in
Asia. While these papers concentrate on economic development on a
country or firm level during the crisis, they do not provide adequate
explanation on what caused the crisis. One feasible way for deficiencies
in corporate governance to propagate a currency crisis is through in-
creased leverage. We try to examine this issue in our cross-sectional
regression, using country-level variables of corporate governance. The
results give some support to the view that corporate governance plays
an independent role in increasing corporate leverage. However, a word
of caution is needed: To properly study the effects of corporate gov-
ernance, firm-level variables should be used. While we can see the
merit of this approach, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
Whether the corporate sector’s choice between foreign and domestic
debt affects the probability and the severity of currency crises is still an
open question. The measure of leverage we report in this paper does not
distinguish among different sources of debt financing. However, by
estimating measures of exchange rate exposure on a firm level, we can
at least partially deal with this problem. Disaggregated data on debt
financing for emerging and developing economies, such as the ones we
consider, is not easily available, so indirect measures are necessary.
The analysis, however, has interesting implications and deserves fur-
ther research.
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La Porta, R., F. López-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1998. Law and finance.
Journal of Political Economy 106 (December): 1113–55.
Lemmon, M., and K. Lins. 2003. Ownership structure, corporate governance and firm value:
Evidence from the Asian financial crisis. Journal of Finance 58:1445–68.
Mitton, T. 2002. A cross-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East
Asian financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 64 (May): 215–41
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1999: Asia and the global crisis:
The industrial dimension. Paris: OECD.
Pomerleano, M. 1998. The East Asia crisis and corporate finances. The untold micro story.
Emerging Markets Quarterly 2 (Winter): 14–27.
Radelet, S., and J. Sachs. 1998. The onset of the East Asian financial crisis. Working Paper
No. 6680. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Rajan, R. G., and L. Zingales. 1995. What do we know about capital structure? Some
evidence from international data. Journal of Finance 50 (December): 1421–60.
Schneider, M., and A. Tornell. 2004. Balance Sheet Effects, Bailout Guarantees and
Financial Crises, Review of Economic Studies 71:883–913.
795Corporate Financial Policies and Performance
